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TE A C HI N G NOT E S  
 
The Kuwait Task Force:  





Virtually all national security planners decry the lack of interagency planning and cooperation, 
yet very few attempts have been made to codify or solidify this critical process successfully. This 
case study demonstrates that a great part of insuring interagency cooperation and integration 
rests with mid-level planners and staff members.  They must not only know their own area of 
expertise, but need to be ready to advocate courses of action by identifying and utilizing 




a. To understand that policy guidance is often difficult to ascertain and transmit. 
b. To appreciate that civil-military planning is important in the context of current 
national security strategy. 
c. To grasp the fact that interagency coordination is difficult owing to: 
i. organizational prerogatives; 
ii. lack of coordinating mechanisms; and  
iii. understanding “who’s in charge,” which is not always apparent or 
accepted. 
d. The U.S. military is not a monolith but is made up of diverse and often competing 
agencies and forces. 
e. Civil Affairs forces and doctrine can be valuable to national security policy but 
need to be assessed and addressed more precisely. 
2. Target Audiences 
a. U.S. government agency officials with national security responsibilities: 
i. National Security Council 
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ii. State Department 
iii. U.S. Agency for International Development 
iv. Office of the Secretary of State/Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization 
v. Commerce Department 
vi. High-level U.S. military staffs (Joint Staff, regional commands) 
vii. Potential senior military leaders 
viii. Civil-military planners 
ix. Civil Affairs officers 
x. Army Reserves planning and employment in support of operations 
3. Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes to be  
Considered in this Case Study 
a. Knowledge of Civil Affairs capabilities 
b. Knowledge of prerogatives and authorities relating to planning and conducting 
national security operations: 
i. Joint Staff 
ii. Regional Command  
iii. Other U.S. government agencies 
iv. Armed services 
v. National Security Council 
c. Appreciation of complexities of policy formulation 
d. Appreciation of sensitivities and prerogatives of Defense Department agencies 
e. Appreciation of the need for appropriate, timely, and effective development of 
policy guidelines 
f. Understanding of the personality factors that are always in play in high-level 
politics 
g. Consideration of when aggressive staff actions are appropriate 
h. Consideration of the best ways to coordinate State Department/embassy and 
regional commander/Pentagon actions 
4. Analysis and Process 
During this case study, have the students adopt different organizational roles in order both to 
understand and to evaluate the motivations and perspectives of various organizations involved in 
formation and oversight of national security policy. 
 
a. Perspectives to Consider:  
i. Civil Affairs: 
ii. Planners at each level 
iii. Commanders and unit members 
iv. Department of the Army-- prerogatives and concerns  
v. USSOCOM-- prerogatives and concerns 
vi. USCENTCOM-- prerogatives and concerns  
vii. Joint Staff-- prerogatives and concerns 
viii. Office of the Secretary of Defense-- prerogatives and concerns  
ix. State Department 
x. U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait 
xi. National Security Council, White House 
b.  Issues to Consider and Questions to Ask: 
i. What is the relationship between the service provider, the regional 
commander, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
with regard to civil-military plans and operations? 
ii. What is the proper relationship between CA staff officers and other 
agency (for example, Department of State, USAID, embassy, Department 
of Commerce) officials? 
iii. How does the State Department, the U.S. Ambassador and embassy 
officials engage and impact military plans?  And how/ who decides who 
has the lead? 
iv. Should there be more structured ways of bringing military and civilian 
agencies together on civil-military matters? 
c. Roles of CA commanders and their unit members: 
d. Are CA commanders also advisers? If so, to whom? 
e. How can CA Reserve soldiers make more of an impact on active duty 
commanders and civilian agencies? 
f. How proactive can one be without being insubordinate? 
g. Is the National Security Council informed of civil-military interagency concerns 
and issues?  If so, how regularly and at what depth of granularity? 
h. Who should coordinate civil-military plans and guidance? 
i. Who is in charge of policy oversight during an operation? 
j. How could unity of effort have been achieved better? 
k. Can we trust to this process to work in the future?  
5. Lessons learned:  
a. Have we learned from this and other civil-military challenges (Panama, Somalia, 
Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan) so that the problems encountered here have been solved 
and will not be repeated? 
b. Was the creation of the Kuwait Task Force merely due to fortuitous circumstances 
and was it the best option? What points of friction existed forming the Kuwait 
Task Force? 
c. Have these points of friction been overcome, or are they still there? Are potential 
points of friction even greater today? 
6. TEACHING PLAN 
The commonly accepted view of the restoration of Kuwait is that it worked well only because of 
the deep pockets of the Kuwaitis. The simple fact is that the operation was a success because of 
the efforts of a few dedicated officials to create good policy quickly.  
 
How much initiative should middle managers exercise in driving national security issues? 
a. Introduction 
i. Assign the case study as a read-ahead. Provide the following guideline 
questions to be considered from the frame of reference of each 
organization that took part in the scenario described in the case study. 
ii. What authority did each organization represent as this situation played 
out?  
iii. Were its prerogatives, capabilities, and authorities properly framed and 
carried out or was the organization marginalized, left out, or ill used? 
iv. What organizational prerogatives did each organization believe were 
important for it to protect? 
v. What organizations were necessary or appropriate for each organization to 
coordinate with; which of these should have been regular meetings? 
vi. Were there meetings or planning linkages that occurred that you think 
were inappropriate? 
b. Priming 
i. Lead a short discussion of the opening days of Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm to set the stage. 
c. Questions and Process 
i. Assign groups of two to three students (or one each if small class size will 
allow) to represent the views of the agency assigned to him or her. Allow 
students to volunteer for organizations they would like to represent. Assign 
the following roles: 
- 352d CA Commander, Brigadier General Howard Mooney 
- State Department and 352d member, COL Randy Elliott 
- Office of the Secretary of Defense CA staffer, LTC Paul Mikesh 
- Joint Staff CA planner, LTC Dennis Barlow 
- Member of the staff of the headquarters of the Department of the Army 
- Member of the staff of USSOCOM 
- Member of the staff of USCENTCOM 
- Chief, Army Reserves 
- Ambassador to Kuwait Edward “Skip” Gnehm 
- National Security Council member Robert Gates 
ii. Task the student groups to answer the following questions: 
- What authority did your organization have in this situation? Was it 
properly framed, or were you marginalized, left out, or ill used? 
- What organizational prerogatives did you believe were important for your 
organization to protect? 
- What organizations do you feel were necessary or appropriate to 
coordinate with; which of these should be regular meetings? 
- What meetings or planning linkages occurred that you think were 
inappropriate? 
- If you (your organization) could have a “redo” on this, what would you do 
differently? 
Allow the student teams fifteen minutes to develop answers to these questions, then have 
one of the group answer the questions in such a way that they can be presented to the 
class. Do not allow any critique or discussion at this point—just capture the responses. 
Now reassign the roles, this time assigning students to organizations to which they 
showed the greatest disdain or negativism during the first round. Give the new groups ten 
minutes to develop answers to the same questions, and have those answers posted directly 
under the comments of the first group for the same organization. 
d. Class Discussion 
i.Review both sets of comments for each organization, and pull out 
consistencies/discrepancies between the two different student groups. 
  ii.Develop consensus on what were effective and ineffective actions of each group 
(including acts of omission and commission). 
 iii.Discuss whether difficulties arising from this action seventeen years ago have been 
remedied, remain the same, or have grown worse. 
 iv.Allow students to opine about the best ways to assure adequate implementation of 
policy guidance. 
e. Homework assignment:  
Have each student take the list of persons involved (both by-name individuals and 
those named only by organization) and place the following “Personnel Action to be 
Taken” for each player. Each must be assigned one of four actions: (1) promote early, 
(2) give a poor evaluation (precluding promotion), (3) give an impact award, or (4) 
take no action. 
f. Board Plan 
Use ten slides (butcher block paper, etc.)—one for each organization involved in the process—
and identify the key prerogatives, considerations, an 
